



SASKATCHEWAN ELOCUTION AND DEBATE ASSOCIATION

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## Mandatory Military Service



This house should implement compulsorily military service for all Canadian Citizens.

SEDA receives fundina from



Research prepared by Janessa Weir

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[www.saskdebate.com](http://www.saskdebate.com)

*This is a values resolution.*



What is conscription? (taken from the Canadian Encyclopedia)

Conscription, the compulsory enlistment of citizens for military service. Forms of conscription were adopted by the Canadian government in both world wars.

### World War I

By late 1916 the terrible casualties at the front in France and Flanders were beginning to cause reinforcement problems for the Canadian commanders overseas. Recruitment at home was slowing, and the manpower and enlistment system was disorganized. For PM Sir Robert BORDEN, the first necessity was to assist the men in the trenches, and by May 1917, when he returned to Canada from the Imperial War Conference in London and from visits to the trenches, he had decided that compulsory service was necessary. He announced his decision in Parliament on May 18 and then offered a political coalition to Sir Wilfrid LAURIER, the Liberal leader. After consulting his supporters, Laurier refused. Québec would never agree to conscription, he believed, and if he joined the pro-conscription coalition French Canada would be delivered into the hands of Henri BOURASSA and his nationalistes. The course was set for collision.

By the fall, after enormous difficulty, Borden had created his UNION GOVERNMENT, and the MILITARY SERVICE ACT became law on 29 Aug 1917. Virtually every French-speaking MP opposed conscription, and almost all the English-speaking MPs supported it. The election of 1917 was similarly divided, and English Canada gave Borden his mandate to put conscription

into effect. In Jan 1918 the process of call-ups began, but out of the 401 882 men registered (and despite the lifting of farmers' exemptions in the spring of 1918), only 124 588 were added to the strength of the CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE; 24 132 men made it to France by the war's end. As a military measure conscription was a failure; as a political measure it had largely been responsible for the re-election of the Borden government, but it left the Conservative Party with a heavy liability in Québec and in the agricultural West.

J.L. GRANATSTEIN

### World War II

As the threat of a new war in Europe became acute, the question of military conscription again caused lively political debate in French Canada. The federal Liberals, sensitive to strong francophone feelings on this issue, repeatedly pledged not to resort to compulsory enlistment for overseas military service. War broke out in Sept 1939, and by the spring of 1940 the government had adopted the NATIONAL RESOURCES MOBILIZATION ACT providing for enlistment for home defence. Registration took place almost without incident, except for the public opposition of Montréal mayor Camillien HOUDE, who was later interned.

In 1941, as recruitment slowly progressed, more voices were raised in favour of conscription, first within the Conservative Party and later among English Canadians in general. To appease the supporters of conscription, Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie KING decided to hold a plebiscite asking

Canadians to release the government from its anti-conscription promises. In Québec, the Ligue pour la défense du Canada campaigned for the "no" side, and on 27 Apr 1942, 72.9% of Québec residents voted "no," while in the other provinces the "yes" vote triumphed by 80%. The government then passed Bill 80, authorizing conscription for overseas service if it was deemed necessary. Québec's BLOC POPULAIRE continued to fight against conscription by presenting candidates for the Aug 1944 provincial elections and the June 1945 federal elections.

By the autumn of 1944 J.L. RALSTON, minister of national defence, was convinced of the need for conscription. Unexpectedly high casualties on the front, combined with a large commitment to the RCAF and the RCN, left the Canadian Army short of manpower. King, who had hoped he would not have to invoke Bill 80, replaced Ralston with Gen A.G.L. MCNAUGHTON, a supporter of voluntary service. On Nov 22, however, the prime minister, acknowledging the open proconscriptionist sentiments of many of his anglophone ministers, reversed his decision in an effort to save his government and announced that conscripts would be sent overseas. Even though only 12 908 conscripted soldiers, unaffectionately known as "zombies", were actually sent abroad, this second conscription crisis again worsened relations between anglophones and francophones in Canada, though to a lesser extent than during WWI.

Title: Only thing Canada's reservists need cut is some slack

Author: Christie Blatchford

Source: Globe and Mail

Date: Thursday, January 21, 2009

Website:

<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/only-thing-canadas-reservists-need-cut-is-some-slack/article1435628/>

Sergeant George Miok, Sergeant Kirk Taylor and Corporal Zachery McCormack – three of the young soldiers who were killed, along with Private Garrett Chidley and Canadian journalist Michelle Lang, in a massive roadside bomb late last year – have all been laid to rest.

What these three had in common, which has received remarkably little notice – they were all reservists, or part-time soldiers.

Sgt. Miok, who was also a teacher, was a member of 41 Combat Engineer Regiment, a reserve unit based in Edmonton; Sgt. Taylor's home unit was the 84 Independent Field Battery in Yarmouth, N.S., and Corp. McCormack was an "Eddie," a member of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment, a storied infantry unit.

I didn't know any of them but experience tells me they would have been as fiercely proud of their real units as Pte. Chidley was of being a member of the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

In Afghanistan, reservists are usually attached as individuals to the battle group, and when they are killed

overseas, their reserve identities are usually subsumed by the larger regiment – officially referred to, if at all, only obliquely, as in, “based in Yarmouth” or “from Edmonton.”

Yet throughout Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, reservists have been there. They have given lives and limbs, just as the regulars have. Every roto to Kandahar has had at least 300 reservists (out of a total of about 2,500 soldiers) and some as many as 500-plus. They do the same jobs and take the same risks as their full-time counterparts and, once deployed, are also paid the same and receive the same benefits. Some of them have to take unpaid leave from civilian jobs, or put promising careers on the shelf, for the privilege of going.

Yet traditionally, when budget push comes to shove, the reserves take a harder hit than the regular force – chiefly because, where in the regular force wages come from a separate envelope of funds, in the militia it's all of a single piece, so when you cut reserve dollars you're cutting training, bullets, travel, pay and people. Thus, what purports to be suffering dispersed equally in fact isn't.

It's happening again, and was even as those three young men were buried this month.

According to what Brigadier-General John Collin, the commander of Joint Task Force Central Area (it means Ontario), has been saying at town hall meetings across the province, the army is looking to chop 5,000 reservists.

The cuts are completely at odds with the government's stated position that both

the regular army and the reserves are to grow as part of the Canada First defence strategy, and raise the question: If Ottawa has been giving the army the money to grow, what the heck has the army been doing with it?

The key cuts are being made to what are called “Class B” contracts, those reservists who hold full-time jobs, many in training positions.

As Lieutenant-Colonel (retired) Blair McGregor told me recently in a furious note, “reserve units are being stripped of the full-time support staff that is so desperately needed to train the part-time soldiers we rely on.” Lt.-Col. McGregor was until 2008 the Commanding Officer of the Seaforth Highlanders in Vancouver, home unit of Captain Trevor Greene, who was axed in the head and nearly killed while serving in Afghanistan in 2006.

According to Lt.-Col. McGregor, John Selkirk of Reserves 2000 (a group formed to fight for the militia) and others contacted by The Globe and Mail, contracts for Afghanistan-deploying reservists have been cut by a month, reservists who have put civilian lives on hold are having theirs cancelled at the last minute and training budgets are being slashed, with training in some units cut to a half-night a week. The cuts are also being applied to recruiting, with the next recruit classes in some units cut by more than half. As Mr. Selkirk, the former honorary colonel of the Brockville Rifles, says, “That's the difference between growing and probably shrinking.”

And reserve units, once shrunk, are then vulnerable to government pressure to amalgamate with other units.

“I haven't seen it this bad since the late 1980s, '90s,” says one non-commissioned officer at an Ontario reserve unit; this, remember, was the period that former chief of the defence staff Rick Hillier described as “the decade of darkness.”

As Lt.-Col. McGregor says, “The militia regiments that have stood the test of time ... are being threatened with starvation in order to make ends meet. Without a force generator like the reserve regiments, our Canadian Forces will be very hard-pressed to make the contribution that is required....we know from the historic record that there is always another emergency around the corner.”

(He wrote that before the earthquake flattened Haiti, a country with which Canada has strong ties. If the army wasn't overstretched before, it will be now.)

The truth is that the reserves and its citizen soldiers have always been unappreciated by the bureaucracy at the Department of National Defence and sometimes by government.

To Lt.-Col. McGregor, the reserves should function for the regular army as the junior leagues do for the National Hockey League. Yet Canada is one of the few countries in the world where the army reserves are smaller than the regular army. This makes no sense, he says. “There should likely be a 2:1 or 3:1 reserves to regular force ratio.

“A further truth about the reserve army is that you can't rip it apart and then easily or quickly rebuild it later when you need it. As in the hockey analogy, each hockey team in any league has a first, second and third line and each team has leadership in the form of a coach, manager, captain and several assistant captains.

“And soldiers,” he says, “like to belong to cohesive and proud organizations and in Canada these are called regiments. They are the ‘teams’ on which soldiers exist.”

In the national game, anyone who doesn't perform is swiftly fired. Canada's soldiers, reservists included, have performed beyond expectations. Would that the same could be said of those who make these maddening and shabby decisions.

## **Rights and Responsibilities of Canadian Citizenship**

All Canadian Citizen's whether born or naturalized have Rights and Responsibilities accrued to them upon receipt of their citizenship. These rights and responsibilities must be maintained and are based on Canadian Laws and the shared values of the society. Many of these are defined in the [Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms](#), which is part of the Constitution of Canada. Certain of the rights and responsibilities are listed herewith and are tested as part of the Citizenship test.

Rights and Freedoms	Responsibilities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- legal rights;</li> <li>- equality rights;</li> <li>- mobility rights;</li> <li>- Aboriginal peoples' rights;</li> <li>- freedom of thought;</li> <li>- freedom of speech;</li> <li>- freedom of religion; and</li> <li>- the right to peaceful assembly</li> <li>- apply for a passport,</li> <li>- run in elections, and</li> <li>- right to vote in elections</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- understand and obey Canada's laws;</li> <li>- express opinions freely while respecting the rights and freedoms of others; and</li> <li>- help others in the community;</li> <li>- care for and protect our heritage and environment;</li> <li>- eliminate discrimination and injustice.</li> <li>- vote in elections( municipal, provincial and federal)</li> <li>- support Canada's ideals in building the country</li> </ul>

**Title:** 'Get out of our schools,' military recruiters told

**Author:** Brenda Branswell

**Source:** The Montreal Gazette

**Date:** October 29, 2009

**Web site:**

<http://www.montrealgazette.com/business/schools+military+recruiters+told/2156968/story.html>

## 'Get out of our schools,' military recruiters told

The Canadian military has no business recruiting in Quebec schools, argues a newly formed coalition made up of unions and student groups.

If the army wants to recruit, it should open recruitment centres and "leave schools alone," said Réjean Parent, head of the Centrale des syndicats du Québec (CSQ).

When it made its debut last month, the coalition called it worrisome to see the army in schools recruiting youths who aren't even 18 yet.

"We're not against a military career," said Xavier Lefebvre Boucher, head of the Fédération étudiante collégiale du Québec, which represents 21 CEGEP student associations in the province. "What we simply say is get out of our schools."

A spokesperson with the Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre in downtown Montreal argues that what it does in schools isn't recruiting.

"It's information that we give to youths. We don't recruit in schools," said Capt. Lucie Rosa.

Military staff do what all the other employer and educational institutions do on site, which is to provide information, Rosa said.

No one fills out a job application form there, she added.

The kiosks at the English Montreal School Board's annual career fair yesterday included several local CEGEPs and the McDonald's restaurant chain.

A steady stream of students gathered around the three military booths - the naval reserves, the 34 Canadian Brigade Group and the Royal Military College of Canada.

Several Grade 11 students from EMSB high schools said they had no objection to the military's presence. "They have a total right to do that," said Giancarlo Ferrara, 16.

Ferrara spoke at length with a soldier from the Black Watch regiment and later said in an interview that he was interested in joining but would talk it over with his parents.

Sgt. Paul Dubé, who is with the Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre, said staff visit career fairs and events at universities.

"It's a popular table," Dubé said of the military kiosk.

"We're talking about subsidized education that we offer. We're talking about our programs for technical jobs for the Royal Military College," Dubé said at the EMSB event. "And we're letting students make their own informed decisions."

Schools rarely prevent them from visiting, Rosa said.

Alexandre Vidal, a spokesperson for the Centre des ressources sur la non-violence which is spearheading the

coalition, countered that there are many CEGEPs across the province where the military no longer shows up because the student associations opposed it.

Parent said an army major from Ottawa has asked to meet with the CSQ executive council. "You have to believe that our campaign is starting to affect them," Parent said.

**Title:** Canadian military sets sights on student athletes

**Source:** CBC News

**Date:** Thursday, October 19, 2006

Web site:

<http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/10/19/athletes-military.html>

The Department of National Defence is stepping up recruitment efforts aimed at university athletes through a \$500,000 marketing agreement with Canadian Interuniversity Sport.

The military views student athletes, especially those involved in a team sport, as prime candidates for its officer training programs, according to documents filed with the agreement.

Peter Metzals, director of marketing for the CIS, said Thursday that the three-year deal provides the Canadian Forces with visibility opportunities at sporting events, including signage, as well as one-on-one meetings between recruiters and student athletes who might be interested in a military career.

The Canadian Forces will also be able to put its recruiting logo on the CIS website, with linkage to its website.

"We look at this as a great opportunity for student athletes to pursue something

different in terms of a career, if they choose," Metzals told CBC News Online.

He said he can understand the focus on student athletes by the Armed Forces.

"They're all fit, intelligent people who are leaders within their communities and on the field of play," Metzals said.

"They are individuals who have learned to manage their time, balancing school, athletic commitments and families."

The Canadian military has several programs aimed at university students at large, including the Regular Officer Training Plan, which covers tuition costs and provides additional funds in return for a five-year service commitment.

**Title:** That's gratitude – Reservists are serving their country – and risking their livelihoods

**Author:** Charlie Gillis

**Source:** Maclean's

**Date:** August 17, 2006

**Web site:**

[http://www.macleans.ca/canada/national/article.jsp?content=20060814\\_132006\\_132006](http://www.macleans.ca/canada/national/article.jsp?content=20060814_132006_132006)

When the call came through, Paul, a master corporal in the Canadian Forces reserves, was coated in camouflage, soot and a sheen of sweat. But the 35-year-old soldier from Toronto figured the message must be urgent, so he rushed to find out what was wrong. "It was my office telling me I had made a mistake filling out the forms for my leave," he recalls, noting that he was miles away from the nearest land line -- a pay phone at the base offices -- at the time. After

weeks of trudging through the brush near Meaford, Ont., as part of his training for active duty, he was near the end of his tether with an employer who failed to grasp what he was trying to accomplish in the reserves. "I was totally exhausted, I hadn't eaten in two days," he says.

"Here they were calling me over some stupid problem with paperwork. It definitely was not cool."

It would get worse. Paul -- who asked that his identity be withheld because he was speaking without the army's approval -- lost three days of pay because of the paperwork foul-up. Then, in a decisive exchange upon his return, the head of the Toronto finance company where he worked cornered him for a face-to-face conversation. "You were one of our best employees," the executive said ruefully, "until you got into this silly army thing."

Paul quit the firm three weeks later -- "I knew at that moment that I couldn't stay" -- and found another job. But stories like his are playing out with increasing frequency throughout Canada's army reserves, as the so-called "weekend warriors" who back up the country's 62,000-strong force of regulars are drawn into the all too real world of gun battles, ambushes and roadside bombs. Fully 300 soldiers in Afghanistan, or 13 per cent of Canada's 2,300-strong contingent, are part-time troops who do their training on weekends, holidays or leaves granted by their employers. With just 2,700 more regulars ready at any given time to go on rotation, the forces are leaning ever harder on the 23,000 civilian soldiers back home to fill out missions, or to plug gaps left by departing regulars.

That means they are leaning on the firms and institutions that employ reservists. To accept a six-month deployment like Afghanistan, a reserve soldier must spend another six months training, bringing his entire commitment to a full year. And while there's nothing compelling part-timers to serve in danger zones, most join with the idea of participating in some sort of mission. As one soldier interviewed by *Maclean's* put it: "If you don't want to see a little bit of action, then really, why sign up?"

The result, inevitably, is friction between reservists and their bosses. Leo Desmarreau, the executive director of the Canadian Forces Liaison Centre, a joint civilian-military body which works to mediate these differences, estimates the number of soldiers seeking assistance in workplace disputes has increased from roughly 30 per year before the mission in Afghanistan to more than 100 last year. Most cases are easily settled, he says. "We encourage reservists to have a clean, clear break from their work situation before they go on tour." But some are not.

One officer interviewed for this story returned from a tour in Afghanistan in early 2004 to find that his job with the Ontario government had been given away. He had tried to extend his leave by six months to complete his mission, a highly touted initiative which involved civilian outreach in the villages around Kabul. But a manager back home who was eager to promote another employee denied him, and filled the job in his absence. By the time he got back to pursue the matter, his union membership had lapsed and -- as if to add insult -- the army itself decided it no longer required his services.

With no medical or dental benefits, and no one to help him fight for his job, the soldier (who also sought anonymity) sank into despair. "I'd always thought the military was supposed to be a kind of large family," he says. "Now I felt like I was being cut adrift." Only after a colonel who had known him in Afghanistan intervened did he get another assignment with the military, and even then the whole experience left him jaded. "I know some guys come home to worse troubles, like post-traumatic stress," he says. "But to come back and be treated like a piece of crap is pretty traumatic, in itself."

Not surprisingly, the issue has become a hot one in the military community, especially since the death in Afghanistan of Cpl. Anthony Boneca, a reservist from Thunder Bay, Ont. Soldiers and family members, conversing on unofficial military websites like *Army.ca*, say Boneca's passing illustrates the risk part-timers are undertaking for their country at great cost to themselves. Others have called on Ottawa to act on the findings of a 1995 commission urging legislation that would force employers to keep jobs open for those on training or tour. "My husband is having a tough time right now trying to get leave from his job for training," wrote one woman in late May. "He actually works for the feds and even though they have regulations in place to help employees who are also reservists, they seem disinclined to go by them."

Many critics point to measures taken in other countries, saying Canada lags badly. The U.S. has laws forcing employers to protect the reservists, they noted, while Britain compensates employers whose workers volunteer for

active duty. Australia, too, provides more than \$800 per week to companies who release workers for military service, and bans discrimination in the workplace against reservists. Canada, by contrast, has done little more than pass legislation guaranteeing jobs in the event reservists are called for compulsory service.

Considering that hasn't happened since the Second World War, it is something less than a grand gesture. "To my thinking, we have a moral obligation to these guys," says Bob Bergen, a research fellow with the Calgary-based Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. "We can do better."

So what route should Canada, with its limited means and wholly voluntary reserve force, take? Desmarteau warns that U.S.-style laws, which forbid employers from firing reservists, lead to workplace discrimination, pushing those soldiers off hiring lists and limiting their chances for promotion. "We've seen this in other countries," he says. "It's a very real problem." Other critics argue that compensating employers would put extraordinary and possibly unnecessary strain on the public purse. These are the choices now facing Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor, who has committed to expanding the reserves by 10,000 troops -- and who publicly agrees with the need to protect their civilian jobs.

Officials in O'Connor's office say the minister has asked his department for advice on the issue, and hopes to bring forward a new approach later in the year. "The ultimate goal," says a spokesman, "is to help with the recruitment and retention of reservists in the Canadian Forces." Whether that's soon enough to help soldiers like Paul -- already working up the nerve to ask his new

bosses for time off -- remains to be seen. Canadians may consider the lives of their soldiers precious beyond value. Those soldiers' livelihoods appear to be another matter.

## **Canada's Military**

### **Canadian Forces in the 21st century**

**Last Updated April 21, 2008**

#### **[CBC News](#)**

In June 2005, the Canadian Forces announced a major overhaul of its command structure - with a new emphasis on its mission within Canada. The goal: to respond more quickly to domestic disasters and terrorist threats.

Then defence minister Bill Graham said the new Canada Command will also improve co-ordination between the military and Canada's security and border control agencies, while reinforcing the country's commitments under the North American Aerospace Defence Command.

He said the announcement was the first step in a larger plan to revamp Canada's military, a force that has been criticized by the U.S. and other NATO allies as underfunded.

In the 2005 budget, the Liberal government promised a nearly \$13-billion boost in military spending for the next five years. The Conservatives' budget in 2006 allocated \$1.1 billion to

the Canadian military over two years, as part of \$5.3 billion in funding coming over the next five years.

As well, during the last week of June 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced \$15 billion in spending on military vehicles, including transport planes, heavy-lift helicopters, troop carrier ships and trucks. The spending will be spread out over several years.

Canada's military budget for 2008 was \$18.2 billion. It's projected to reach \$19 billion next year. In the 2008 budget, the government pledged to increase military spending by two per cent a year for 20 years, starting in 2011, which would add an additional \$12 billion over those 20 years.

### **Canada Command**

The officer in charge of Canada Command, Lt.-Gen. Marc Dumais, is the second most powerful uniformed officer in the Canadian Forces - reporting directly to the chief of defence staff.

The aim is to cut red tape and deploy soldiers and supplies quickly across the country when they are needed.

The Department of National Defence said the commander of Canada Command "will be responsible for the conduct of all domestic operations - routine and contingency - and will be the national operational authority for the defence of Canada and North America."

That means the new Canada Command will be this country's equivalent of the U.S. military's Northern Command, created after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

The headquarters for Canada Command are in Ottawa, and there are also six regional headquarters: Northern, Pacific, Prairie, Central, East and Atlantic.

Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier said regional commanders will have the authority to deploy land, sea and air resources where they are needed, without going through what he called the current structure's "complex matrix" of commanders.

Here's a look at Canada and its military by the numbers.

### **Population**

- Today: 33,143,610 (2008 estimation)
- Second World War: 11,507,000 (1941 census)
- First World War: 7,207,000 (1911 census)

### **Land**

- Canada occupies 9,093,507 sq km, making it the second largest country in the world after Russia.
- Canada has 243,791 km of coastline and 8,893 km of borders.

### **Military expenditure**

- Canada's defence budget for 2008: \$18.2 billion.
- Promised budget boost: \$12 billion over 20 years beginning in 2011-12.

### **Armed Forces**

- Today: 62,000 military personnel including 9,000 sailors, 19,500 soldiers, 12,500 air force personnel and 20,000 administrative and support personnel. There are also about 25,000 reservists.
- Second World War: 60,000 men and women enlisted in Canada's armed forces in one month (September 1939) after the declaration of war.
- First World War: More than 600,000 Canadians enlisted to fight in the First World War from 1914-1918.

### **Navy**

- Today: There are 33 surface ships, four submarines and 9,000 sailors in Canada's navy.
- Second World War: At the end of the war, Canada had the third-largest fleet in the world, after the U.S. and the U.K. 23 Canadian ships were sunk by German U-Boats in the Battle of St. Lawrence alone.
- First World War: During the course of the First World War, Canada's naval service grew to a force of 9,000 men and 100 ships.

### **Canadians on the front lines**

- Today: More than 2,900 members of the Armed Forces are deployed overseas.
- Second World War: More than one million served and approximately 45,000 died.
- First World War: Almost 620,000 Canadians served in First World War and 66,000 died.
- Canada in NATO: Of NATO's 26 member countries, Canada is...First in land area (9,093,507 sq. km), and sixth in total military spending (\$13 billion)
- 

**Title:** Not necessarily conscription...bringing the forces up to strength: a question of motivating youth to serve.

**Author:** Adam Chapnick

**Source:** National defense and Canadian forces

### **Web site:**

<http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no4/chapnick-eng.asp>

Thanks largely to the dangerous mission to Afghanistan, and the situations in Darfur and the Middle East, Canadian awareness and commitment to the nation's armed forces has undergone a profound resurgence of late. As recently as the 1990s, the Forces were largely regarded by the federal government as a money drain, and by large portions of the general public as an out-of-date, ineffective, and perhaps even irrelevant institution. The national economic recovery, effective public pressure by pro-military enthusiasts, and an increase

in pride in Canada's place in the world have changed all of this.

A recent poll by the Innovative Research Group found that two-thirds of Canadians agree that for the country to play a significant role in world affairs, it needs an effective armed forces. During the last election campaign, after the Martin Liberal government promised to spend an additional \$13 billion over the next 20 years to revitalize the Canadian Forces (CF), the Conservatives pledged to spend almost \$2 billion more. And while the Liberals expected to add 5000 regular and 3000 reserve personnel, the Conservatives have created a recruiting target of 15,000 additional personnel in total. Both parties seem to believe that "people," as former Defence Minister Bill Graham put it, "remain the greatest strength of Canada's military." The less partisan Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has agreed. It recently released a report arguing that the budget for the Department of National Defence (DND) should be increased even more to somewhere between \$25 billion and \$35 billion. The Liberal proposal would eventually result in a Forces budget of about \$22 billion, and the Conservative proposal, \$24 billion, supposedly allowing for between 15,000 and 20,000 additional personnel.

There must be significant expansion, say the experts, and there will be, reply the politicians. But how? Buying new equipment, modernizing military tactics, and reforming inefficient bureaucracies can be accomplished relatively easily, but even in an era when youth unemployment is dangerously high, recruiting new personnel has proven much more difficult. In fact, judging by

current trends, without major changes in the approach to recruiting Canadian youth, the proposed increases will not be met. In April 2002, Auditor General Sheila Fraser issued a damning report of the state of the recruitment and retention abilities of DND. Although she found that efforts were being made to improve the recruiting process, to increase wages and benefits, and to make the Forces more open and accessible to previously underrepresented groups – such as women and ethnic minorities – the results had not been realized quickly enough. The navy still needed people with technical skills, she noted at the time, the army still needed engineers, the air force still needed pilots, and the entire armed forces still needed additional medical personnel.

More than four years later, with even more money available, in two separate reports, both Fraser and Yves Côté, the Canadian Defence Ombudsman, have found that the results remain disappointing. The CF is still understaffed, and, in spite of some incremental improvements, particularly among better-educated recruits, there are few signs of long-term positive developments. The current system, in Côté's words, "is neither efficient nor is it adequate to meet the needs of the Canadian Forces." Put simply, even if the general public, the so-called experts, and the political elite have increased their commitment to the Canadian military, the country's youth – the present and future of the Armed Forces – have not, and without them, there can be little hope of meeting the recruitment goals.

Critics might suggest that the lack of interest among youth with respect to the

armed forces is symptomatic of a general decline in the commitment of this new generation of Canadians to their country as an influential armed power on the world stage. Young people, the argument goes, lack a real sense of Canada's military past. Since only three provinces require that students take modern Canadian history in high school, most youth have a limited understanding of how their country evolved in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. They do not know, for example, about Canada's military accomplishments in the world wars, and in the Korean War. They are only vaguely aware of early successes in peacekeeping and peace support missions. And they have, as one recent poll by the Dominion Institute has suggested, displayed less and less interest in honouring the country's surviving veterans, although it is true that opinions vary on this particular perception. Without these memories of combat, it becomes difficult to develop national pride, and without such pride, there are fewer reasons for today's youth to volunteer to risk their lives overseas.

Generally speaking, critics have allocated blame for this scenario in two different directions. Some have noted in anger that the auditor general's reports dating all the way back to 1990 had predicted a long-term personnel crisis. They therefore blame the military, and DND, for failing to deal with the crisis early enough and effectively. The world has changed, they argue. Security is no longer the exclusive domain of officers and generals. Youth who want to make a difference do not see the military as the best way to do so. And by failing to reinvent themselves effectively, the armed forces have not done enough to convince them otherwise.

Others focus on education. They believe that if Canadian youth knew more about the nation's history, interest in the military would increase. Young Canadians would feel a greater commitment to the future of their country and would understand that we are, and have always been, a nation of significant military accomplishments. If today's youth were taught to appreciate the sacrifices made by previous generations of Canadians to preserve their freedom and freedom around the world, they would feel a duty to do the same for future generations.

Unfortunately, to move the military forward will take more than just better recruitment and more history being taught. Both criticisms are fair, but addressing one of them exclusive of the other will not solve the problem. There is no doubt that the world and the meaning of security have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, security must now be understood as more than just military might, and to convince Canadian youth to join the military will require a modern, progressive and far-reaching approach to national duty and global citizenship. The military will have to make itself more relevant in the eyes of the country's future leaders, and a more rewarding form of service than it is considered today. It is also true that young Canadians do not know enough about their country's past. And in those rare instances when they are presented with the Canadian story in school, too much of it is delivered ineffectively, and it does not result in real learning and appreciation. We have to teach more history, and we have to do it more effectively.

Nevertheless, even if DND continues to modernize its recruitment strategies (for example, it has increased its budget for advertising by over 500 percent since 2000), and even if future young Canadians are taught more history, there are reasons to believe that the CF will still struggle to attract sufficient numbers of Canadian youth. No matter how effective the recruiters, nothing can replace the impact of a veteran's presence in the home. Apart from some recent immigrants, the current generation of Canadian youth is among the first to have almost no direct links to veterans of previous wars. The soldiers who fought in Europe in the Second World War and in Asia during the Korean War might well have told their children stories of their experiences, but, until very recently, today's parents do not have those stories to relate. It is difficult to imagine, barring the obvious recent involvement in Afghanistan, that war can be real to most young Canadians. Unless they have travelled through failed or failing states overseas, the closest they likely will have come to genuine danger will be, at worst, a book or film in school, or perhaps an hour-long visit from a veteran to a school assembly that they may or may not have attended. Try as they might, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for National Defence recruiters to recreate in this country the military culture and sense of duty to which previous generations of young Canadians were exposed.

Teaching more history, and even teaching it more effectively, will also go only so far. Young Canadians today learn differently. Technological advances have made it possible for them to read less, to concentrate for shorter periods of time, and to rely more on

experiential forms of learning. Books and films on Canada's wartime experiences will affect some youth, but not as many as has been the case in the past. And no matter how well taught, fewer of today's youth will be inspired by a typical classroom experience to go out and join the military. If they are not fighting themselves, and they do not know anyone who has fought to preserve Canada's security, no matter what they are told in school, they will have great difficulty understanding what military service even *means*, let alone appreciate its value.

This problem is obviously not exclusive to Canada. In Sweden, the solution is known as full conscription. Under the Swedish military system, in the event of an emergency or a war, anyone living in the country between the ages of 16 and 70 is obligated to help ensure the nation's security. Men between the ages of 18 and 24 must go even further by enrolling in the military and reporting to a training unit if they are accepted for service. For women, the decision to participate is optional, but if they pass a special admissions test, their obligations become the same as their male colleagues. Sweden averages about 8500 conscripts per year from a nation of nine million people, less than one-third the population of Canada.

Such a solution is not at all realistic for Canada, nor will it ever be. Conscription has a history of creating national divisions along linguistic and ethnic lines, as it did in both world wars, and those experiences are unlikely to ever be forgotten. The current approach of the Canadian Forces, which favours better-educated recruits (the *average* recruiting age has increased by close to ten years),

is also unlikely to be entirely helpful in the long run. Today's youth need to be exposed to the military in a positive manner at as early an age as possible, if they are to develop any durable sense of affinity and attraction to military service. Furthermore, the traditional approach to recruitment as a whole, focusing directly on the youth themselves, is out of date. It reflects a technique that might have worked in previous generations, when knowledge of history was better, and when a sense of the country's military tradition was more evident, but as the auditor general's reports have shown, it has not worked more recently and will not work in the near future.

Promoting the military today requires a two-track strategy. In an era when security is understood so broadly, and at a time when the CF has worked exceptionally hard to redefine themselves as professionals, recruiters must focus more explicitly on the social benefits of military service. Young people today might, at least at first glance, be less interested in dying for their country, but they are certainly interested in developing leadership skills. In an age of increased global volunteerism, they generally embrace the idea of 'service before self.' Even though many do not vote, they do have pride in their country. Concepts such as duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage do resonate with them. They believe in bilingualism, and in working with those in need, and they want to 'understand the inherent violence of armed conflict' so that they can put a stop to it. These are all values discussed in the DND publication *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, but how many young Canadians would be aware of this publication and its contents?

Young Canadians generally do not know that the military employs doctors, engineers, technicians, and strategic analysts. They are largely unaware of the paid opportunities for professional and educational development, and they do not realize that service in the military need not be for life. If the CF hopes to attract today's youth, it must show itself in the broadest and most progressive light possible.

It must also be practical. Military recruiters arriving on a university campus in full uniform are open targets for criticism from so-called 'peace activists,' among others. As a result, trips to schools and universities tend to 'preach only to the converted,' alienating the ambivalent, and further upsetting the critics. Recruiters should instead target high school guidance counselors and university and college career centres. Ambitious Canadian teenagers who are worried about having to work while obtaining a university degree should routinely be informed of the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP), which not only pays the tuition of military recruits, but also covers the costs of their books and provides them with a salary that includes a pay-living differential for those who attend school in more expensive cities. Summers are spent being paid a reasonable wage to develop what future employers will interpret as leadership skills, the ability to work as a member of a team, and also to develop a second language capability.

Upon graduation, recruits do indeed owe the nation five years of uniformed service, but during this time, they receive what is increasingly becoming a competitive salary, they are provided with full benefits, and they are given

opportunities for further self-improvement. Unlike many of their colleagues, university graduates of the ROTP program do not have to spend their final year of school worrying about finding a job after graduation. Furthermore, while these graduates train, the CF contributes yearly to what is called a Personnel Enhancement Program (PEP), which provides funding for officers who seek to improve their qualifications, *especially* during their uniformed careers, but also in anticipation of the transition back to the civilian population. Pursuing further higher education is also encouraged, and rewarded with increased pay and responsibility. A similar plan exists for college students, and opportunities are also available for those interested in careers in trades.

The old military culture in Canada is fast becoming obsolete. Being a member of the Canadian Forces no longer *generally* and *presently* commands the pride and respect that it would have in previous generations. We must create a new form of this culture in Canada, and to do so, the Department of National Defence must integrate the values it holds that resonate with young Canadians more directly into its marketing strategies. It must spread its message through people who do not wear uniforms and who do not automatically provoke what can often be misleading and damaging images and ideas.

At a time when Canadians have developed a more sophisticated appreciation of the importance of a strong and capable military than they have in at least a generation, it is crucial that increased government spending not result in failure and disappointment.

New equipment and greater focus are important, but if we lack the people to carry out the missions, the CF will have no future. And without it, Canada has much less of a place in the world. The action must begin now. There is no longer any time to waste.

**Title:** Canada's global role: a strategic assessment of its military power

**Author:** Joseph R Nunez

**Source:** Parameters

**Date:** Autumn 2004

**Web site:** <https://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04autumn/nunez.htm>

The comity between Canada and the United States is testimony to the strength of liberal peace. The Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1818 is still in effect and has been described as the "longest lasting and most successful disarmament treaty in international history."<sup>1</sup> Canadians do not go to bed worrying if the United States is going to attack. We have become so interdependent that it is impossible to see our paths diverging to such a degree that our special relationship is jeopardized. Within the Americas, Canada is the democracy with which we have the most in common, whether it is history or kinship. In fact, Canada and the United States are an example of how values and interests can converge so pervasively that each side takes the other for granted, akin to a long-married couple. Nevertheless, important political differences are highlighted when administrations emerge from very different political viewpoints, as was the case between Prime Minister Jean Chretien and President George Bush. Moreover, Canada generally worships at

the United Nations altar, whereas the United States is skeptical about the United Nations' ability to provide timely and sound handling of global problems. In truth, both positions are somewhat flawed, because one state is trying to use an international organization to magnify its modest power, while the other state is more eager to use its superpower status to disengage from slow UN deliberations to craft its own solutions to security threats.

A major cause of divergent views is the power imbalance between these two neighbors. On the whole, Canada is a middle-power—it possesses a great-power economy and a less-than-middle-power military. Its neighbor is a superpower. This comparative sense of weakness inspires some Canadians

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to complain of US hegemony. Yet this complaint often has more to do with cultural influence than with economic or political-military dominance. The Canadian economy continues to grow more vibrantly than its NAFTA partners on a per capita basis, and Canada is a major beneficiary of free trade—the United States is its number one trading partner.

The two countries also enjoy a long and institutionalized defense partnership, but it is not without its difficulties. The defense relationship has been strained for well over a decade, although the cracks in this partnership did not rise to public attention until the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Bluntly stated, Ottawa tolerated a major decline in its military for years while it signed up for more UN peacekeeping missions than it

could adequately manage.<sup>2</sup> Washington was relatively quiet about this martial decline until homeland security rose as a national security priority, an imperative connected to the Global War on Terror.

### *Canada's Place in the World*

Canada's current global conundrum is tied to its identity crisis. Formerly an important player on the world stage, its influence is now greatly diminished. Critics are quick to point out that Canada spends little on its military, less than \$265 per capita, making it last among major North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members.<sup>3</sup> On a Gross National Product (GNP) basis, Canada spends just 1.1 percent on defense, putting it on par with Liechtenstein.<sup>4</sup> One senior Canadian officer described his country's challenge to overcome its geostrategic handicap as, "We are a regional power without a region."<sup>5</sup> Ottawa still possesses a measure of global clout through its dynamic economy. Choices it makes early in the 21st century will have a major impact on its ability to halt this decline, especially in defense, and to rebuild its strength and stature within the international system. It is fair to say that Canada is reassessing its future defense direction, scaling back on traditional peacekeeping commitments, increasing its role in peace enforcement operations, and taking a new look at its security relationship with the United States.

Canadians see themselves as global peacekeepers, and this is reinforced in the Canadian press, vividly displayed on their currency, and echoed in conversations on the street. But the reality is different from the perception.

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Using United Nations peacekeeping operations statistics, the Canadian contribution to UN missions is now rather small. Of 92 countries furnishing forces, Canada ranks 34th, placing it in the middle third. With just 239 service members deployed, Canada pales in comparison to, say, Pakistan with 5,252 on UN missions. Even within the Americas, Canada is not the largest contributor. Uruguay, Argentina, and the United States provide more peacekeeping personnel.<sup>6</sup>

Over the last 15 years, Ottawa has developed a greater hemispheric orientation, a huge departure from its traditional Euro-centric focus. This change began after World War II, as Canada moved from the British sphere to a North American commitment.<sup>7</sup> A key challenge for Canada is deciding between two roles—continuing to support a multitude of UN missions or asserting greater interest in a regional approach to peacekeeping and other operations through hemispheric cooperation.<sup>8</sup> Part of the soul-searching is due to demonstrated difficulties in mustering adequate forces with proper equipment, not to mention deployment and sustainment. Experts such as Joseph Jockel argue that the country faces hard choices because Canada's peacekeeping orientation has led to a significant degradation of its combat capability, particularly its ability to sustain military operations at brigade level.<sup>9</sup> This UN peacekeeping orientation began long ago with Canada's involvement in the Suez Crisis. In his book, *Canada's Army: Waging the War and Keeping the Peace*, author J. L. Granatstein explains the change in military focus:

At the United Nations on November 1 [1956], Lester Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, proposed that the Secretary-General "begin to make arrangements with Member Governments for a United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out. . . . My own government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force." This idea and Pearson's subsequent role in creating the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) won him the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize. . . . The crisis affected the army in other ways as well. First, Pearson's Nobel Prize made Canadians into the world's leading believers in peacekeeping. Every world crisis after 1956 saw Canadians demanding their troops bring peace to the world.<sup>10</sup>

The logic of a diminished Canadian military is easy to grasp. Internationally, Canada enjoys the security umbrella afforded by the United States. Thus, it acts as a free rider and can fund its defense on the cheap. Monies not devoted to defense are used to pay for domestic programs. Probably no single

document illustrates this policy better than the “Speech from the Throne” given on 30 September 2002, outlining then-Prime Minister Chretien’s vision for Canada. The international dimension of the speech is less than ten percent of the text. Moreover, it raises more questions than it answers. There is a pledge  
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“to work with its allies to ensure the safety and security of Canadians” and “to work through organizations such as the United Nations to ensure that the rule of international law is respected and enforced.”<sup>11</sup> It vaguely states that Canada “will work with the United States to address our shared security needs.”<sup>12</sup> Finally, there is a brief allusion to the military:

In the face of rapid change and uncertainty, the government must engage Canadians in a discussion about the role that Canada will play in the world. Before the end of this mandate, the government will set out a long-term direction on international and defence policy that reflects our values and interests and ensures that Canada’s military is equipped to fulfill the demands placed upon it.<sup>13</sup>

### ***Canadian Defense after World War II***

Canada long defended itself with militias, not standing armies. It was not until after World War II that Canada made a strong commitment to a full-time force. Even so, the government was vague and tentative in its support for the end-strength originally planned,

resulting in an army that was half of what was promised, and great uncertainty over defense requirements.<sup>14</sup> A major part of that uncertainty revolved around its ascending ally, the United States.

As the Cold War emerged, Canada and the United States became partners in defense, but did not institutionalize this partnership until 1957 with the creation of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). This idea of working together to defend the North American continent dates back to 1940 when the two executives, Prime Minister Mackenzie King and President Franklin Roosevelt, met in Ogdensburg, New York, to discuss the war and common defense challenges. A binational command, NORAD was established in 1958 and headquartered in Colorado Springs, Colorado, where it still is today. The command’s original mission was to provide “operational control of continental air defenses against the threat of Soviet bombers.”<sup>15</sup>

The practical effect of the NORAD agreement was that it helped justify the modernization of a Canadian Air Force. It did little to bolster the Canadian Army. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, founded in 1949, was more beneficial to Canada’s ground forces. Though obviously more focused on Europe than North America, NATO provided a reason for Canada to raise and maintain combat brigades. The Canadian Army’s mettle, and Canada’s military as a whole, were tested and validated with their participation in the Korean War, a conflict supported by the United Nations.<sup>16</sup>

The mid-1950s, however, marked the apex for Canada’s military strength. After that, two factors served to reduce the nation’s combat capability. The first

was Ottawa's peacekeeping orientation, and the second was the diminishing fear of a Soviet attack. In 1968 Pierre Trudeau ascended as the new  
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Liberal Party Prime Minister to further change the military. Under his leadership, Canada reduced its forces in Europe (under NATO) by half. Additionally, peacekeeping declined in priority.<sup>17</sup> During this period Canada's navy lost its only aircraft carrier, its army said goodbye to a number of proud regiments, and its air force was forced to wait another decade to receive new aircraft.<sup>18</sup>

Canadian forces did not fare much better under Conservative Party leadership, however. The need to cut budget deficits, coupled with the end of the Cold War, meant that additional support was not forthcoming, and cutbacks became the order of the day. Further damaging Canada's military reputation in NATO was the realization that because of declining airlift and sealift capabilities, Canada could not deploy a brigade with sufficient speed.<sup>19</sup> One Canadian historian refers to the period after 1968 as "professionalism under siege."<sup>20</sup> The major criticism resounding among various experts on Canadian military history is that strategically the country traded ends for image, choosing form over substance. It was more important to have a presence than to materially shape the outcome. During this same period, Canada jumped into every UN peacekeeping operation and maintained its involvement in NATO and NORAD, albeit with reduced forces and rapidly declining equipment, logistics, and strategic lift, not to mention morale.

In the post-Cold War global environment of growing nationalism and

failed states, the 1990s reflected a growing demand for peacekeepers and peacemakers. For Canada's shrinking military, it was a means to an end—survival. But significant costs arose from this emphasis on peacekeeping. The military leadership disliked peacekeeping duty because it reduced unit combat effectiveness. Peacekeeping was antithetical to maintaining the fighting ability of soldiers because they rarely performed combat tasks. Another problem was that many missions lasted indefinitely, depriving the military of soldiers needed to maintain units at home. Additionally, the increasing number of missions, coupled with a smaller military, meant that many peacekeepers would return from one mission and then soon deploy on another. If you add the declining level of support to these soldiers, it is easy to see how morale declined precipitously. Finally, while Canada perceived itself to be the "world's moral superpower," performing good works, making peace, and advancing human security, this was a hollow reality.<sup>21</sup>

### ***Canada's Security and Defense Posture in the 21st Century***

A growing number of Canadians see their country in positive domestic and negative international terms. The economy has been healthy for many years, affording Canadians a high quality of life and a comprehensive social welfare system. But beyond the borders the picture is very different, as Andrew Cohen explains:

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The truth is that Canada is in decline in the world today. It is not doing what it once did, or as much as it once did, or enjoying

the success it once did. By three principal measures—the power of its military, the generosity of its foreign aid, the quality of its foreign service—it is less effective than a generation ago. . . . To argue that Canada has abandoned or diluted its traditional roles in the world isn't terribly new. The argument has been made in different ways different times. It is just that now—with the country's leadership in play, the war on terrorism in train, and the military in eclipse—the sense of loss has become more acute, gathering a momentum of its own.<sup>22</sup>

Clearly, the events of 2001 changed Canada's views about North American security. They also challenged assumptions about Ottawa's place in the world, and the nature of its political, economic, and military relationship with Washington. Canadian concern grew over the development of a new security architecture for North America. But it should surprise no one that Canadians are favorably oriented toward increased security cooperation. NORAD provides a working framework for such cooperation. Historically, Washington and Ottawa worked closely during World War I and II—in fact, Canada jumped into the fight before the United States, and it was Ottawa that persistently encouraged Washington to join the war. This cooperation produced a strong defense partnership. The two

countries are the only Western Hemisphere members of NATO. Most Canadians see the US initiative to create Northern Command through the dilemma that journalist Jim Travers describes as the choice to “share defense or be tossed aside.”<sup>23</sup> Borrowing an analogy from classical literature, Travers describes Canada's security challenge:

Shocked awake by Sept. 11, Washington, or Gulliver, is not about to be constrained by the petty concerns of the Lilliputians. Canada is the most exposed of the Lilliputians. Perched precariously along the great undefended cliché and historically committed to securing America's back door, [Canada] faces an unambiguous imperative: It can share responsibility for continental defense or it can be tossed aside as Gulliver stirs.<sup>24</sup>

Reflected in these choices are concerns about the adequacy of Ottawa's military, the uneasiness of living next to a superpower, and concern that Canada might be abandoned if it does not pull its share of the continental security mission. Others see difficult scenarios. Douglas Bland believes that terror attacks on the United States changed the important relationship between the two countries. Critical to this change is the huge impact that would result from Canada not doing its part to cooperate in preventing terrorism from penetrating the United States from the north. Bland asserts that “Canada faces no greater foreign and

defense policy challenge than finding an appropriate and credible way to reassure the United States that Canada can live 80/81

up to the 1938 Roosevelt-Mackenzie King agreement that no attack on the United States could come through Canadian territory.”<sup>25</sup>

The good news is that Ottawa is moving more toward Washington on security and defense matters, while still raising concerns about sovereignty and consultation. Canada has taken significant steps to improve border security in recognition of the need “to safeguard the Canadian and American homeland.”<sup>26</sup> And Michael Kergin, Canada’s Ambassador to the United States, has remarked, “Like many countries in the world today, the United States is Canada’s primary foreign policy concern . . . without the United States, Canada is pretty isolated.”<sup>27</sup>

Canadian and US interests have much more in common—trade, rule of law, and democracy—than any differences that exist, so it is wise to join as partners in the war against terrorism.<sup>28</sup>

John Manley, former Deputy Prime Minister, has argued along the same lines. A complex set of intersecting issues—border reform, transportation, law enforcement, financial and immigration issues, and security cooperation—challenge Canadians to make what Manley calls “clear and conscious choices as a nation . . . what we value, what we will seek, what we must defend—and, ultimately what we are willing to do in order to achieve these.”<sup>29</sup> Acknowledging that sovereignty is an important Canadian concern, he argues that it “is fundamentally about making choices, and about acting responsibly in the national interest so that we are able to

preserve that field of choice for ourselves . . . [S]overeignty must be dynamic—or else our country cannot be.”<sup>30</sup> Thus, if Canada wants to preserve its favorable situation as the number one trading partner of the United States, it must get beyond the shrill rhetoric about “American imperialism,” something present in academic circles and the media.<sup>31</sup> Manley recognizes that Ottawa can better preserve sovereignty by constructively engaging Washington to address bilateral responsibilities as well as benefits—that there is no free lunch. He argues, “Much of the almost 135-year history of our nation has been about how we establish and exercise our sovereignty within a shared North American space—almost always accompanied by ritual fear and anxiety over how a greater North America might mean a diminished Canada.”<sup>32</sup>

Until recently, Canada was known for peacekeeping and little else since World War II, though it did see combat in the Korean War, and some troops experienced brief combat engagements during peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and Croatia. This changed significantly with Canada’s 2001 deployment to Afghanistan. Canadian forces fought well with US forces against al Qaeda fighters. Even before Canadian soldiers entered the fray, they were well regarded by American commanders. The US commander in this particular instance, Colonel Frank Wiercinski, told reporters that because the Canadian soldiers were well trained, they would be integrated fully into 81/82

his task force. Wiercinski stated, “We want to bring capability that we both can put together, and by using the best of each. And I think we’ve done that. They

bring capability, not liability, to this fight.”<sup>33</sup>

Canadian military ability was verified on 14 March 2002, when their forces engaged in fierce combat during Operation Anaconda. The Canadian-American offensive demonstrated the resolve and abilities of both countries. It was also a historic event, because it had been almost 50 years, dating back to the Korean War, since a Canadian military force had participated in a ground offensive.<sup>34</sup> The Canadian performance obviously impressed US military commanders, because the Princess Patricia Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) subsequently was placed in charge of Operation Harpoon, a mission to flush enemy fighters from mountainous caves.<sup>35</sup>

While there is no question that Canadian soldiers are of high quality and add real value to any operation, there are many concerns about the quality of their equipment, logistical support, air and sealift, and their ability to conduct operations above the battalion level. These concerns, though often raised by allies such as the United States, ring truer when voiced by Canadian officers.<sup>36</sup> Afghanistan is a perfect example. The deployment of the 3 PPCLI was a difficult and frustrating process. Once in Afghanistan, the commander requested a third rifle company to make the unit fully functional and interoperable. Peacekeeping experiences from the 1990s actually constrained the unit to the point of embarrassment, and the 3 PPCLI was forced to quickly change to more robust rules of engagement. When reflecting on the quality of provisioning afforded to his soldiers, and comparing it to how the Americans were supported,

the Canadian commander stated that his unit felt like “sorry second cousins.”<sup>37</sup>

On the positive side, the 3 PPCLI brought unique capabilities that contributed to mission success. For example, the Canadian armored reconnaissance vehicles, called Coyotes, afforded mobility and protection, while their .50-caliber sniper rifles added accurate long-range effect. The commander stated that the combining of different cultures actually served to create a force multiplier.<sup>38</sup> The two units learned from each other, and brought unique experiences and expertise that benefited all. In short, the sum was truly greater than the parts. For example, the Canadian troops were experts at cold-weather operations and very skilled in their ability to influence community attitudes in the local villages. On the other hand, the Americans afforded the 3 PPCLI an opportunity to participate in the first combat air assault in Canadian history, and provided a good deal of logistical support for common classes of supply. Canadian soldiers and their commanders understand that in more cases than not, they will be joining instead of leading campaigns. That mindset alone is valuable for combined or multinational operations. In the 82/83

first deployment to Afghanistan, the Canadians furnished a battle group that was integrated within an American brigade.

The United States expected 3 PPCLI to remain longer in Afghanistan, but Canada pulled the unit back after six months. Another disappointment was Canada’s refusal to join the “coalition of the willing” for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Ottawa was troubled that Washington did not receive UN Security Council support for its decision to go to

war against Baghdad, even though it agreed with the Bush Administration that there was justification to end the regime of Saddam Hussein. In the end, Ottawa mended fences with Washington by returning to Afghanistan in 2003 with 2,000 troops and provided the commanding general of the operation.<sup>39</sup>

***Political and Military Soul-Searching***

The 21st century has not been internationally kind to Canada so far, save for trade. Diplomacy and defense have been in decline for a number of years. Since 2001, Canada has been forced to reconsider its relationship with the United States, its place in North America, in the Americas, and in the world. The Liberal Party, in power for the vast majority of the past four decades, is very popular in Canada because of its success in running the economy and providing an extensive social security network. It is not a favorite of the military, though officers are not likely to complain because of their strong ethos of subordination to civilian democratic authority. But there is little doubt that they feel betrayed by their political masters. This is evident in official military documents. When reflecting on the state of the land forces, the army's strategy report stated:

Physical infrastructure is poor and deteriorating in some areas. The Army is facing significant shortfalls in firepower (both direct and indirect) and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities. On the personnel side, the burden of incremental taskings

imposed by cuts, establishments, additions (announced in *The 1994 White Paper*) and a continual high personnel tempo are taking too great a toll on many soldiers. There has been an excessive draw on our pool of Reservists to compensate for gaps in the Regular Force structure. Command and control (C2) is stretched due to staff cuts and heavy demands of new strategic initiatives. Collective training opportunities are inadequate to maintain formation-level combat capability, and we are experiencing serious skill fade in some areas. Finally, there is concern over the morale of the Army. There is a sense of uncertainty and, not insignificantly, a sense of mistrust of the senior leadership caused by constant change. A lack of unity in thought, purpose, and action is too often apparent.<sup>40</sup>

Canadian forces underwent significant transformation over the last decade, but it was neither by design nor positive. Units have been withdrawn from 83/84 Europe. They have been forced to deploy on a multitude of difficult missions under declining budgets. Much of their equipment is outdated, ragged, shabby, or simply not available.<sup>41</sup> Units

have been mothballed, never to return, but requirements are on the rise. The military is suffering from “cultural upheaval.”<sup>42</sup>

The quality and size of the forces that a country can muster and deploy on global missions have a huge impact on its international standing. Trade is also an important measure of a country’s place in the world, of course, but military force and trade are related, particularly given Canada’s interdependency with the United States on security and exports. Now that trade is in danger. For years there seemed to be no domestic price to pay for letting the military fade, while perpetuating the myth of Canada as the great peacekeeper. But in the age of terror, Ottawa has good reason to change its course regarding military support.<sup>43</sup>

Canada used to take pride for being able to “punch above its weight.” Now it punches below its weight, causing many businessmen to fear for the future.<sup>44</sup>

While the United States and Canada are both liberal democracies, enduring allies, strong trading partners, and culturally related, the security threats of this new age place additional burdens on the liberal community of states to stand and fight against non-state actors—sometimes aided by rogue and failing states—that employ terror, transnational crime, and globalized communications to threaten democracies. Ottawa can no longer offer glittering platitudes and then duck out when the global work must be done and the bills come due.<sup>45</sup> It may be a cliché, but freedom is not free, and neither is trade, at least not the generation or maintenance of it. To keep a global economic system functioning, democratic states must be willing to deter and defeat forces that threaten their way of life. Canadians are beginning to

understand that they are way overdue in their payments, and must rapidly recapitalize defense assets to meet the burgeoning demands of today and tomorrow.

There is also a realization that Canada can no longer depend on NATO or the UN to advance Canadian values or provide a “soft balance”<sup>46</sup> against its powerful and assertive neighbor. Like it or not, Canada has cast its future with the United States. Yet, while Ottawa may first consider the Washington perspective, that does not imply subservience to its superpower neighbor. Canada can (and does) say no (or yes) when that is warranted in terms of Canadian values and interests. The Iraq war of 2003 is a good example of this, and so is the Afghanistan stabilization mission. Canada made a strong contribution to the international effort in Afghanistan because it was a US initiative that was given multilateral legitimacy by NATO and the UN. Already, Canada is exhorting its NATO partners to take on a greater role in furnishing troops, and this is in no small part due to the fact that Ottawa is straining to maintain its commitment over time.<sup>47</sup>

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Another important part of this political-military soul-searching is homeland and hemispheric security cooperation, and the two are related.<sup>48</sup> As Canada reduced its commitment to Europe, it increased its commitment to North America and the Western Hemisphere.<sup>49</sup> Since the early 1990s, Ottawa has sought greater engagement, trying to make up for lost time when it saw itself more as an extension of Europe. The creation of NAFTA in 1994 set a course that forced Canada to expand its strategic focus on North America. Where NORAD and

other agreements provided a cooperative-defense mind-set, the free trade agreement cemented the strategic orientation, and this is largely due to the fact that Canada, above all else, is a trading nation.<sup>50</sup> Its vibrant economy depends upon the large export sector. Security scholars are increasingly focused on the concept of “trilateral security.”<sup>51</sup> Concepts like security perimeter, security community, and continental security are now common terms in government, academia, and policy institutes. While these are still largely ideas, rather than implemented, they are discussed in terms that are moving deliberately in that direction.<sup>52</sup> The military cooperation piece is particularly noteworthy. Canada’s membership in hemispheric forums includes the Defense Ministerials of the Americas (DMA), the Inter-American Naval Conference (IANC), the Conference of the Armies of the Americas (CAA), the System for Cooperation Among the Air Forces of the Americas (SICOFAA), and the hemispheric-wide reporting on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs).<sup>53</sup> In the fall of 2003, Canada hosted the 25th Commanders Conference of the CAA. This provided an opportunity to foster continued integration, increase the exchange of defense-related information, expand collaboration among American armies, create unity, strengthen inter-American friendships, and demonstrate Canadian leadership within the Americas.<sup>54</sup> Lieutenant General Rick Hillier, CAA President and Canadian Army Commander, emphasized the need to work together because “no one country alone can meet all the challenges in providing that basic security,” which he argued was the mutually reinforcing

relationship between human security and the security of the state.<sup>55</sup>

In the summer of 2002, Canada joined the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). This is an international defense and security organization that promotes cooperative security interests in the Western Hemisphere and oper-

ates under the authority of the Organization of American States (OAS). In the short time it has been a member, Canada has demonstrated its leadership value through the actions of its senior member on the IADB, Rear Admiral Ian Mack.<sup>56</sup> This expansion within the Americas is consistent with Canadian values and interests. Since the 1980s Canada has participated in a number of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions. At the same time, Canada’s trade within the Americas has grown at a rapid rate.

The creation of US Northern Command in 2002 prompted Ottawa to study the possibility of greater military cooperation. Given that the command’s area of responsibility includes Canada, the United States, and Mexico—the members of NAFTA—it was logical to find a way to engage constructively. The Binational Planning Group serves this purpose. It provides Canada a bridge from NORAD to NORTHCOM. In typical Canadian fashion, the process is slow, methodical, and concerned about the preservation of sovereignty. Despite this largely bureaucratic obstacle to increased security cooperation, however, the actions of assigned officers have been positive and reflect a high level of mutual respect, innovation, and professionalism.<sup>57</sup> In particular, one area of homeland defense directly benefitting from this collaboration is naval cooperation between Canada and the

United States, which bolstered the security of both countries' coastlines and ports. Given their nature and manner of deployment, along with their mutual reinforcing actions that have enhanced interoperability, the two nations' sea services are more disposed toward cooperation; thus, it is a good model for the two armies to emulate.<sup>58</sup>

### ***The Way Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities***

The Canada that Prime Minister Paul Martin now leads is moving further away from the United States culturally, and that has significant implications for economic, political, and military cooperation.<sup>59</sup> Ottawa is at an important crossroads that will determine its future direction in this new century. There has always been latent anti-Americanism in Canada. Historical differences—loyal colonials versus revolutionaries—and asymmetries of power underscore elements of distrust and dislike that are ever-present to one degree or another.<sup>60</sup> That is not to say that the relations between these two neighbors are rocky. In fact, since 11 September 2001 Canada has cooperated very closely with the United States to improve border controls, share intelligence, and track down terrorists.<sup>61</sup>

A huge challenge for Prime Minister Martin is to find a path midway between shrill defiance and fawning lockstep accommodation of the United States. Thumbing your nose at Uncle Sam, aside from poisoning relations, also serves to fan the flames of anti-Americanism, and this damages Ottawa's long-term interests. Rolling over for Washington makes Canada look weak and either unable to set its own course or unwilling to offer an alternative. On

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top of this, Canada should refrain from the temptation to act as the moral superior in the partnership, taking the "role of provider of wise counsel."<sup>62</sup> Such a haughty position is unwarranted, particularly considering Canadian words versus deeds.<sup>63</sup> If it is necessary to advise, do it privately. Remembering Canada's positive influence on the US entry in World Wars I and II, and Canada's willingness to make large commitments to back its moral position, should serve as constructive examples of how it can best influence US behavior. If the business view of government is negative, it is much worse when it comes to diplomacy and the military, key components of foreign policy. Prime Minister Chretien's Achilles' heel was foreign policy. Canadian influence around the world declined during his tenure, and that is not just an American view.<sup>64</sup> More than an infusion of funds, many institutions require new leadership and strategies. And this leadership and strategic vision must come from the top. There is little doubt that Paul Martin can lead Canada in a new direction within North America, the Western Hemisphere, and the world. His remarks, even before he assumed the leadership mantle, indicate that he clearly understands his environment and that major foreign policy change is afoot:

Our bilateral relations must be conducted on a far more sophisticated basis. Our goal must be to keep our two nations open to each other. . . . The absence of consensus in the U.N. should not condemn us to inaction. Multilateralism, after all, is a means not an end.<sup>65</sup>

One of Martin's most daunting challenges is to navigate his way through the government's bureaucratic maze to develop and implement a national security strategy. Canada's foreign policy has remained basically unchanged for nearly a decade. The government's last foreign policy white paper was published in 1995 and the last defense policy review in 1994. Even in tandem, these do not constitute a grand strategy. Aside from now being grossly out of date, these documents did little to link political, economic, and military elements of power in support of Canadian values and interests. Outside observers often are puzzled as to why Canada does not have a national security strategy or an interagency process to coherently support its implementation. A close look at domestic and international factors provides some answers. As a country, Canada's internal stability depends upon keeping its various provinces—particularly Quebec—happy, and that is no easy task. There is no unitary political culture, and Alberta and Quebec are polar opposites on the political spectrum. Given these major cleavages, it is risky to articulate a national security strategy because many Canadians are likely to object. Furthermore, setting a strategic course entails costs. The national budget must apply resources to support strategic ends, such as providing for a strong military to prevent war and promote peace. And if more dollars go toward defense, then popular domestic programs might suffer cuts. The international reasons for refraining from delineating a national security strategy are also significant. Canada is not an independent actor in the international state system. Thus, any

strategy must acknowledge that Ottawa does not control its own destiny, whether it is the defense of the country or the deployment of force to promote its human security agenda. Defense of the Canadian homeland is dependent upon major US assistance. Canadian heralding of multilateralism is more than high-minded liberal internationalism; it is also a practical means of executing thrifty globalism. If this illusion of complete sovereignty and robust international action is credible, it allows Canada to focus on domestic priorities while still promoting international trade. It is also a safe agenda. Since the Canadian military cannot be deployed or employed independently and in significant numbers around the world, it keeps the government from taking decisive action that might be unpopular at home or in other countries. In fact, this is an insurance policy against making a bad call on unilateral intervention.<sup>66</sup> From the waning years of the Cold War until 2001, this approach worked for Ottawa, even if it was writing defense checks that it knew were going to bounce, eventually. Prime Minister Martin is more strategically oriented than his predecessor. Just looking at defense, there are many good signs. His choice of David Pratt to serve as Defence Minister was a bold move for several reasons. Pratt bucked the conventional Liberal view by supporting Canadian intervention—with the United States—in Iraq. He has always supported the military, whether with regard to funding, new equipment, morale, or training.<sup>67</sup> Finally, Pratt is a strategic thinker who has some interesting ideas on security cooperation with the United States.<sup>68</sup> Unfortunately, Pratt lost his seat in Parliament in the June 2004 election,

and thus must step down as Defence Minister. One hopes the Prime Minister will select a like-minded replacement. After his election as Prime Minister, Martin's first visit was to the Department of National Defence (DND), sending a strong message of support. The impact was particularly significant since Prime Minister Chretien had declined to visit the DND during his decade of leadership. Martin thanked the men and women in uniform for their work at home and overseas, and then went on to address the challenges of the new century:

With the end of the Cold War has come a different kind of international conflict, a different kind of trauma. No nation can isolate itself from the perils and trials, the tribulations that the world goes through. Our capacity as a nation to respond on behalf of the world community is very heavily dependent upon the men and women of our armed services.<sup>69</sup>

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One officer at Martin's speech stated hopefully, "We want to believe him; we want to believe that he does realize that in order to achieve a lot of his goals, such as putting Canada back on the world stage, . . . he can't do it with the state of the military he has now."<sup>70</sup>

If actions speak louder than words, then Martin is sending a strong message to the military. After his speech, he followed up by approving Pratt's urgent request to immediately fund new helicopters to replace the aging Sea

Kings, despite a freeze in new federal spending.<sup>71</sup> Further bolstering Martin's position as a leader for positive change were initiatives to reform the structure of government to provide for greater domestic security and to improve relations with the United States.<sup>72</sup> To achieve strategic ends he is readdressing the means, by refocusing on structure and resources; soon the policies will follow that provide the ways. The biggest challenge is to provide enough resources to bolster the military. For example, the new helicopters will not begin to appear for another four or five years. What is worse is that calculations of equipment life-cycles did not take into consideration the toll that frequent and difficult operations, like Afghanistan, have exacted on materiel.<sup>73</sup>

### **Conclusions**

Canada has an important role to play in North America, the Americas, and the world. The nexus of trade and security imperatives place it firmly within North America. The Canadian role in the Americas is growing in terms of economic and defense matters. Globally, Canada is challenged to regain its stature as a country that is willing and able to punch above its weight. Key to this is the regeneration of the Canadian forces, who have been asked to do too many missions with too few resources for far too long.

Whether Canadians like it or not, Canada's political, economic, and military power is in no small measure dependent upon the United States. As liberal states, interdependent neighbors, and allies, the two nations share a relationship that is positive overall. Canadians enjoy a high standard of living because they are an industrious people and thrive on their many exports to the United States, which remains their

largest trading partner. Moreover, potential enemies are deterred from attacking Canada because its superpower neighbor would not stand for that.

Canada has 11 percent of the population of the United States, yet it has a military only about 3.75 percent the size of its neighbor's. In budgetary terms, Ottawa spends 2.6 percent of what Washington spends on defense.<sup>74</sup> Canada has neglected its military for a long time because of the impressive security umbrella afforded by the United States, but this cannot continue given the terrorist challenges that threaten established democracies.

Even before 2001, Canada was out of synch in its global vision. Ottawa's peacekeeping orientation was no match for failed states and terrorism.

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The Saskatchewan Elocution and Debate Association (SEDA) is a non-profit organization that promotes speech and debate activities in English and French. The Association is active throughout the province from grade 5 through grade 12, and at the University of Regina and the University of Saskatchewan. The Association coordinates an annual program of speech and debate tournaments and other special activities, including a model legislature.

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For further information:

Saskatchewan Elocution  
and Debate Association  
1860 Lorne Street  
Regina, Saskatchewan  
S4P 2L7

Telephone: (306) 780-9243  
Fax: (306) 781-6021  
E-Mail: [info@saskdebate.com](mailto:info@saskdebate.com)  
Web: [www.saskdebate.com](http://www.saskdebate.com)

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